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INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
EQUAL PROTECTION AND THE RACIAL RESTRICTIVE
COVENANT: A RE-EVALUATION
Racial restrictive covenants are private agreements between property
owners not to sell to members of a prohibited race. For thirty years after
the decision by the United States Supreme Court invalidating discrimina-
tory zoning ordinances,' the states recognized these private agreements;
and this recognition became instrumental in the continuation of residential
segregation.' Their validity was questioned recently by the Court in
Shelley v. Kraemer,3 but the full scope of the holding has not been gen-
erally recognized. A new evaluation of the Shelley case in light of more
recent developments becomes necessary.
Before any constitutional question is raised under the Fourteenth
Amendment it is necessary to find state action.' It is now accepted that
a judicial decision determining state policy is state action within the
meaning of that Amendment,' but the analysis should not be limited to
a determination of the existence of state action without reference to the
nature of the state policy involved. It is axiomatic that implicit in judi-
cial action is an underlying determination of a substantive right; the grant
or denial of a' remedy is merely a manifestation of the substantive finding.
1. Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60 (1917). This case held that segregation
achieved by municipal zoning constitutes discriminatory state action prohibited by the
Fourteenth Amendment.
2. For a discussion of the various rationales by which the courts upheld these
covenants during this period see McGovney, Racial Residential Segregation by State
Court Enforcement of Restrictive Agreements, Covenants or Conditions in Deeds is
Unconstitutional, 33 CAL. L. REv. 5, 7 (1945); Scanlan, Racial Restrictions in Real
Estate-Property Values Versus Human Values, 24 NoTrE DAME LAw. 157, 160 (1948);
Yi-Seng Kiang, Judicial Enforcement of Restrictive Covenants in the United States, 24
WAsH. L. REv. 1, 6 (1949); Note, 1 BAYLOR L. REv. 20, 27 (1948).
3. 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
4. "No State shall . . . deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal pro-
tection of the laws." U.S. CoNsr. AM.ND. XIV, § 1. "[T]he principle has become
firmly embedded in our constitutional law that the action inhibited by the first section
of the Fourteenth Amendment is only such action as may fairly be said to be that of the
States." Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 13 (1948). The finding of state action is in a
sense jurisdictional, for if the court finds no state action, it cannot proceed with the
determination of the substantive rights under the Fourteenth Amendment.
5. "The judicial act of the highest court of the State, in authoritatively construing
and enforcing its laws, is the act of the state." Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78, 90
(1908). See also Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 14 (1948). One writer discussing
this matter stated: "There is equally state action where a state court founds a judgment
upon a rule of substantive law which it 'finds' in the common law, or judge-made law of
the state. Since a rule so made and applied is produced by state action it is subject to
the same test of its validity under the Fourteenth Amendment as it would be if made by
that other form of state action, enactment by the state legislature." McGovney, supra
note 2, at 23.
NOTES
In Shelley v. Kraemer6 the plaintiff sought and was granted an in-
junction to prohibit a Negro from taking possession of premises subject
to a racial restrictive covenant. The Supreme Court, in reversing the
state court, held that the freedom to execute a real estate contract could
not, consistently with equal protection, contain a legal right to practice
racial discrimination; and, where a state court recognizes this discrimina-
tion through its decisions, it must be reversed.' To the extent that the
freedom to contract conflicted with the constitutional provision, the
former had to yield. Three steps were involved in the Shelley case. The
Court had to find state action, then determine whether the lower court's
substantive determination was contrary to the equal protection clause ;
and, finally, if the Court ascertained that the state law did conflict with
the Fourteenth Amendment, it was compelled to strike any remedy granted
by the lower court pursuant to its unconstitutional substantive holding.
The more conservative courts attempted to limit the Shelley rule to
a prohibition of injunctive relief in the restrictive covenant cases.9 This
is the narrowest possible construction of the case, overshadowing its
broader, more significant meaning. Under this narrow interpretation
6. 334 U.S. 1 (1948). The Shelley case arose in Missouri and involved a restrictive
covenant limiting use and occupancy of certain realty to members of the Caucasian race
for fifty years. Shelley, a Negro, purchased the land without actual notice of the re-
striction. The suit to enjoin him from taking possession was brought by the co-
covenantors.
The court of Missouri ruled that: "[The racial] restriction does not contravene the
guarantees of civil rights of the Constitution of the United States." Kraemer v. Shel-
ley, 355 Mo. 814, 823, 198 S.W.2d 679, 683 (1946).
7. For an analogous situation see American Federation of Labor v. Swing, 312
U.S. 321 (1941) in which a state court announced a policy permitting picketing only by
striking employees. The United States Supreme Court determined that freedom of
speech extended to non-employees the right to picket. This was a reversal of the state
policy enunuciated by the state court to the extent that the state policy conflicted with the
constitutional right of freedom of speech.
8. The Court in the Shelley case pointed out that it has "... established the
proposition that judicial action is not immunized from the operation of the Fourteenth
Amendment simply because it is taken pursuant to the state's common-law policy."
Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 19 (1948).
9. In Weiss v. Leaon, 359 Mo. 1054, 225 S.W.2d 127 (1949) the court interpreted
the Shelley decision to hold that ". . . specific performance of a racial restrictive agree-
ment by judicial decree is a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment although the agree-
ment itself is constitutionally valid." Id. at 1060, 225 S.W.2d at 130. The court con-
cluded that an award of damages against the Negro's grantor would not constitute a
violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Correll v. Earley, 205 Okla. 366, 237 P.2d 1017 (1951) involved a conveyance of
property by two white owners to an insolvent grantee who then transferred the property
to Negroes in violation of a racial covenant. In an action for damages alleging con-
spiracy to breach the covenant on the part of the original owners, the court held that
damages could be granted.
Some courts recognized the broader rule established in the Shelley decision and re-
fused to grant damages for breach of a racial covenant. Roberts v. Curtis, 93 F.Supp.
604 (D.C. 1950) ; Barrows v. Jackson, 112 Cal. App.2d 534, 247 P.2d 99 (1952) ; Phillips
v. Naff, 332 Mich. 389, 52 N.W.2d 158 (1952).
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the question soon arose whether damages could be obtained by the cove-
nantors against the person who breached the agreement. To settle the
confusion on this point among state courts, the Supreme Court granted
certiorari in the case of Barrows v. Jackson.'" The Court, looking through
the fact that no direct judicial remedy was sought against the member of
the race in question, held that a state policy favoring racial restrictive
covenants and thus contravening the mandates of the equal protection
clause is as effectively enunciated by a grant of damages against cove-
nantors as by directly discriminatory judicial action.1 There was actually
no new question presented in the Barrows case,' 2 and the Court, to be con-
sistent with its holding in Shelley, was compelled to affirm the decision of
the lower court denying the relief sought.
The Barrows decision seemed to substantiate the belief of many
writers that the Shelley rule spelled the end of the racial restrictive cove-
nant.' There was sufficient doubt left, however, for those courts which
10. 346 U.S. 249 (1953). The Court refers to the cases in note 9 as posing the
problem to be decided. For discussion of Barrow v. Jackson see Notes, 48 NORTH-
WESTERN U.L. REv. 495 (1953) ; 23 TENN. L. REv. 330 (1954) ; 42 GEO. LJ. 161 (1953).
11. The Court stated that to allow damages for breach of a restrictive covenant
.would be to encourage the use of restrictive covenants. To that extent, the State
would act to put its sanction behind the covenants . . .Thus, it becomes not respondent's
voluntary choice but the State's choice that she observe her covenant or suffer damages.
The action of a state court at law to sanction the validity of the restrictive covenant here
involved would constitute state action ... " Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249, 254
(1953).
12. Mr. Chief Justice Vinson did question whether the Court should decide the
issue since no member of the restricted race was asserting his rights before the Court.
The Chief Justice dissented on the ground that since neither of the parties before the
Court could claim violation of their constitutional rights, there could be no relief
granted. Id. at 260.
The majority of the Court, in spite of this argument, found it necessary to protect
the underlying constitutional rights of the prohibited race. "If a state court awards
damages for a breach of a restrictive covenant a prospective seller of restricted land
will either refuse to sell to non-Caucasians or else will require non-Caucasians to pay a
higher price to meet the damages which the seller may incur. Solely because of their race
non-Caucasians will be unable to purchase, own, and enjoy property on the same terms as
Caucasians." Id. at 254.
13. "The [Shelley] decision sounds the death knell for all racial restrictive cove-
nants and related superficially legal schemes as effective weapons in enforcing racial
discrimination .... ." Scanlan, supra note 2, at 190; see also Ming, Racial Restrictions
and the Fourteenth Anendmeint: The Restrictive Covenant Cases, 16 U. OF Cxi. L. REV.
203, 224 (1949) ; Note, 1 BAYLOR L. REv. 20, 44 (1948). One authority expressed doubt
as to how much farther the Court would extend the theories of state action. See Frank,
The United States Supreme Court: 1947-48, 16 U. OF CmI. L. REv. 1 (1948). Professor
Frank stated that a limitation in' the racial restrictive covenant cases is in prospect since
"... the Court went out of its way to reaffirm the Civil Rights cases and to declare
that the Fourteenth Amendment 'erects no shield against merely private conduct, how-
ever discriminatory or wrongful. . . ."' Id. at 24.
Frank also recognized the possible extension of the restrictive covenant cases to hold
that a court may not by its decree achieve a discriminatory result which a state could
not order by direct legislative action. "If we take the interpretation of the restrictive
covenant cases assumed above, then . . . it can rationally follow that the entire realm
NOTES
interpreted these decisions on the narrow grounds of the type of judicial
action involved. Since in both Shelley and Barrows the parties sought an
affirmative enforcement of the covenants, the question remained for the
conservative state court whether a defendant should be allowed to use a
racial covenant as a defense to an action for breach of contract. A Texas
court found no difficulty ruling against the use of such a defense in
Clifton v. Puente,4 a case decided two years before the Supreme Court's
Barrows ruling. There a covenant prohibited the sale of land by a cove-
nantor, his grantees or assigns to any "persons of Mexican descent," and
provided that any land sold in contravention of the agreement was to
revert to the original grantor. Puente, a person of Mexican descent,
purchased the land; but, before he could obtain possession, the original
grantor, acting under the covenant, sold the property to Clifton, who took
possession. Clifton then brought action against Puente to try title to the
land, and the latter filed a cross action for title and possession of the
property. The Texas court held that the racial agreement relied upon by
Clifton was not a valid defense to this cross action. 5
This was not the final word on the problem, however, for the issue
was presented again in the recent case of Rice v. Sioux City Memorial
Park Cemetery, Inc." In that case a Caucasian widow of an Indian
of common law interpretation by a state will be subject to federal judicial review. It is
doubtful that the Court meant to go so far. . . ." Ibid.
McGovney, supra note 2, would take the opposing view. Federal review of decisions
rendered by a state court based on the common law of the state is not an innovation and
has been rather prevalent in the due process cases. American Federation of Labor v.
Swing, 312 U.S. 321 (1941) (discussed supra note 7) ; Bridges v. California, 314 U.S.
252 (1941) (the Court set aside a common law contempt sentence) ; Cantwell v. Con-
necticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940) (the Court set aside the affirmation by the state supreme
court of a common law conviction of the offense of inciting a breach of the peace). Al-
though the Court had no power to redefine the common law of the state, it did have the
power to set aside a state judgment on the ground that it infringed the right of freedom
of speech. In order to have such power the judgment rendered by the state court must
constitute state action.
McGovney reasoned that: "The absence of decisions of the Supreme Court squarely
in point on the Equal Protection Clause is doubtless due to the rarity with which state
courts have made common law rules of procedure or substantive law that are so dis-
criminatory as to constitute denial of equal protection." McGovney, supra note 2, at 24.
This void must surely have been filled with the pointed language in the Shelley case.
See note 8 supra. Also, see the language in the Barrows case, supra note 11.
If the Supreme Court may review state court decisions based on the common law,
the test for such review under the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
should be the same as in the ordinary case involving statutory discrimination.
14. 218 S.W.2d 272 (Tex. Civ. App. 1948).
15. The Texas Court indicated that no valid distinction could be predicated on the
position of a party as a plaintiff or as a defendant. "[J]udicial recognition or enforce-
ment of the racial covenant involved here by a state court is precluded by the 'equal
protection of the laws' clause of the Fourteenth Amendment." Clifton v. Puente, 218
S.W.2d 272, 274 (Tex. Civ. App. 1948).
16. 60 N.W.2d 110 (Iowa 1953), aff'd per curiam, 348 U.S. 880 (1954).
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who was killed in the Korean conflict had purchased a cemetery lot sub-
ject to a contract which limited burial privileges to members of the
Caucasian race. When the cemetery would not allow the burial of her
husband, 7 she brought an action for breach of contract on the theory
that the part of the agreement restricting burial privileges to Caucasians
was invalid. In defense, the cemetery asserted the limiting provision.
The trial court ruled for the defendant cemetery corporation, and, on
appeal, the Supreme Court of Iowa, asserting neutrality, dismissed on
the ground that the parties were merely being left to their agreement."
The Iowa court ruled, in effect, that the right of freedom of contract
contains the freedom to discriminate against a race-the same substantive
holding that was struck down as discriminatory by the Supreme Court-
and then the court acted, in the full sense of that word and in spite of
claims of neutrality, to enforce that right to discriminate.
An equally divided Supreme Court recently affirmed the judgment
of the Iowa court without opinion.'" This result is even more surprising
in view of the almost unanimous decisions in Shelley and Barrows." It
may be asked why the Court could not, consistently with those rulings,
overrule the state's affirmation of this contractual discrimination. The
Court may have been bothered in this case by the fact that the petitioner
entered into a contractual agreement fully cognizant of the limiting racial
clause. The Supreme Court of Iowa emphasized this fact in ruling that
the petitioner should not be entitled to a remedy of damages.2 In the
17. When the body arrived from Korea, it was taken to the cemetery where grave-
side services were held. Later in the day the cemetery notified petitioner that it could
not lower the body into the grave. The body of the Indian was interred in Arlington
National Cemetery by order of President Harry S. Truman.
18. The Iowa courts position is summed up in the following words from its opinion:
"While we must recognize an evolution of our society as disclosed by these recent deci-
sions [racial covenant cases], all of the previous decisions may be distinguished from our
present case in that they disclose the exertion of governmental power directly to aid in
discrimination. . . . Certainly, that factor is not presented here where the state has
maintained neutrality." Rice v. Sioux City Memorial Park Cemetery Inc., 60 N.W.2d
110, 115 (Iowa 1953).
19. 348 U.S. 880 (1954). The even split in the Court was made possible by the
death of Mr. Justice Jackson. When the vacancy caused by this death is filled, the peti-
tioner may be entitled to a rehearing. See, e.g., Gray v. Cowell, 312 U.S. 666 (1941),
313 U.S. 596 (1941).
20. Mr. Chief Justice Vinson's dissent in the Barrows case was the lone vote against
the Court's stand in these cases.
21. The Supreme Court of Iowa saw the claims of the petitioner as extending be-
yond the scope of the United States Supreme Court decisions: "She [the petitioner] is
asking more. She asks us to reform the contract voluntarily agreed to with another
private party. She asks that we remove the restrictive covenant in her contract which
she repudiates and permit her to recover damages from the other party." Rice v. Sioux
City Memorial Park Cemetery Inc., 60 N.W.2d 110, 115 (Iowa 1953).
The Iowa court added that the petitioner would have it ". . . extend the theory an-
nounced in . . . Shelley v. Kraemer . . . to indirect as well as direct support of private
NOTES
Puente case the party asking relief was a member of the race being dis-
criminated against; he sought possession and use of the land. This was
factually like the Shelley case, making it relatively easy for the Texas
court to refuse the defense of the racial restrictive covenant even though
Puente should have had actual or constructive knowledge of the covenant.
It is submitted that the Supreme Court could have, without difficulty, fol-
lowed the reasoning in the Barrows case to extend damages to the peti-
tioner in the Rice case. In all the cases, the controlling factor is the dis-
criminatory state policy arising from the courts' rulings. The denial of
damages in the Rice case will do as much to encourage the restrictive
covenant as would have a denial of damages in the Barrows case.22 The
agreements containing restrictive covenants ... " Ibid. This further language of the
court indicates that it possibly overlooked the Barrows decision even though the latter
case was decided in June of 1953, three months before the Rice decision. The Rice case
was probably being argued before the decision in Barrows came down. This lends weight
to the argument that the Rice case was incorrectly decided.
On appeal to the United States Supreme Court both parties cited the Barrows case.
The petitioner in her brief on the merits pointed out that this case was intended to pre-
vent persons from accomplishing ". . . indirectly what . . . could not be accomplished
directly. . . ." Brief for Petitioner, p. 13, Rice v. Sioux City Memorial Park Cemetery,
348 U.S. 880 (1954).
The respondent cemetery company concluded that "[it does not follow from the
fact that the restrictive covenant cannot be enforced by an injunction in a State Court
. . . nor that a breach of the contract cannot be punished by damages . . . that one of
the parties who freely entered into the contract can recover damages from the other
party because such other party refuses to perform a wholly different contract." Brief
for Respondent, p. 17, Rice v. Sioux City Memorial Park Cemetery, 348 U.S. 880
(1954). The issue was thus squarely presented the Court.
22. Although the argument was not presented to the court, the Rice case could turn
on the fact that organizations which are privately owned or operated but which are
organized for a basic public service are subject to state control. Examples are public
utilities, and railroads. The service rendered may be so basic to society that the organi-
zation acquires the characteristics of a state function. The organization must then com-
ply with those constitutional controls which regulate state acts. "The more an owner,
for his own advantage, opens up his property for use by the public in general, the more
do his rights become circumscribed by the statutory and constitutional rights of those
who use it. Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501, 506 (1946).
The Supreme Court has not been hesitant in preventing discrimination by private
groups carrying on a public function. See Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1953); Smith
v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944); United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299 (1941). The
Terry case involved a private association which each year conducted a primary election to
select candidates to run for nomination in the official Democratic primary. Negroes were
not permitted to vote. The elections were not governed by state laws nor was the state
elective machinery or funds utilized. The Supreme Court held that to keep Negroes
from voting in the elections was discrimination under the Fourteenth Amendment even
though the organization was private. Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1953). The func-
tion of primary elections are basic to political institutions while functions of cemeteries
are basic to cultural and social institutions. Primary elections are now generally state
controlled, and cemeteries in many instances are municipally or nationally owned. Ceme-
teries are often granted tax exemptions, and although these exemptions do not neces-
sarily make a private organization public, it is evidence of a basic public service. Dorsey
v. Stuyvesant Town Corporation, 299 N.Y. 512, 535, 87 N.E.2d 541, 551 (1949). For
examples of statutes giving tax benefit to cemeteries see IND. ANN. STAT. 64-201 (Burns
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Supreme Court's refusal to strike out the racial clause as a defense brings
added confusion into this area which is heightened by the lack of a guid-
ing opinion by the Court. The Court had never before ruled on the
availability of the racial covenant as a defense and this will permit ques-
tioning of the validity of the Puente case as a precedent.
If it is once recognized that state policy cannot contain a right to
discriminate against any race through realty contracts, the racial restric-
tive covenant will no longer be a legal problem. A racial covenant in a
deed or contract no longer has legal significance since the substantive
right to contract gives no such privilege. The fact that covenantors in-
corporate such restrictions in their deeds does not make the covenant
legally valid. What was meant by the dictum of the Court in the Shelley
case that a racial restrictive covenant is valid so long as it is enforced
only by voluntary adherence23 is not clear but probably stems from the
Court's wrestling with the concept of state action; it is clear that the
Court did not mean to establish the legal right to utilize these covenants."
Certainly, there is no anomaly here of a right without a remedy, as some
writers suggest,25 since state policy can no: longer recognize the right to
1933); IowA CODE ANN. § 427.1 (1946).
Whether a decision denying cemeteries the power to discriminate would affect the
numerous church-owned cemeteries now restricted to members of a church is doubtful.
The argument was made in cemetery's brief in the Rice case that an adverse holding
would deny church owned cemeteries the right to limit burial privileges to members of
the church. Brief for Respondent, p. 7, Rice v. Sioux City Memorial Park Cemetery, 60
N.W.2d 110 (Iowa 1953). When a church desires to inter its members together and
exclude other denominations, a type of discrimination results, but a countervailing right
of religious freedom should make it privileged. The cemetery in the Rice case has no
church affiliation. Its only restriction is that a non-Caucasian cannot be buried, and this
restriction has no basis in religion. It should follow, therefore, that the cemetery is not
privileged.
23. Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 9 (1947).
24. Compare the use of the word "validity" in the quotation from the Barrows case
in note 11 supra. This indicates lack of "legal" validity of the covenants. A distinction
must be drawn between a legal right to utilize these racial covenants and the physical
power to agree in this manner. The physical power to commit murder does not make
that act a right. A gambling contract is illegal, but such contracts are agreed upon
frequently. So long as a gambling contract is not dependent on state authority-judicial,
police, etc-their provisions may be enforced by "voluntary adherence." The fact that
they may be and are voluntarily adhered to does not give them legal significance.
One commentator states: "Put another way, though the parties to the restrictive
agreement had taken all the steps they could to make it binding, application of the
Fourteenth Amendment nullified their acts." Ming, supra note 13, at 229.
25. Several writers have worried over the problem of a valid racial covenant with-
out a corresponding remedy. "[I]t seems that the inseparability of validity and remedy
has been destroyed; the Constitution has been invoked to deprive citizens of the use of
their Courts for the enforcement of valid contracts." Crooks, The Racial Covenant Cases,
37 GEo. L.J. 514, 525 (1949).
Another writer states: "The rule, that all judicial assistance is within prohibited
state action and still the contract is good as to private action thereunder is an anomaly
resulting from the language in the amendment and its application to judicial assistance to
covenantees." Comment, 6 LOYOLA L. Rav. 52, 56 (1951). See also Note, 5 MEacER L.
NOTES
use a racial covenant.
The substantive holding in Shelley should not mean that all contracts
containing a racial restrictive covenant will be invalid when recognition
is sought from the court. Only when the racial covenant becomes an
essential element of success on the part of one of the parties will recogni-
tion of that covenant become prohibitory state action under the Four-
teenth Amendment. Therefore, when the racial covenant is not in issue,
the court may enforce other provisions of the contract. When the racial
covenant is in issue, there is .no legal reason why it should be upheld no
matter what form the judicial action may take.
When considering any racial problem the social, economical, and
cultural aspects mustbe taken into account.26 It is generally acknowledged
that even if racial restrictive covenants are given no legal effect, segre-
gated housing will survive for some time." The restrictive covenants
are generally the fourth line of defense against integrated housing,2" and
new defenses may conceivably be proposed.29 If the legal impediments
could be removed, however, it would seem an important step in the right
direction.
REv. 206 (1953).
These arguments are invalid since there is no remedy because there is no legal right
to use racial restrictive covenants. Conversely, of course, the courts are still open to
enforce actual rights of the citizens.
26. For a fine analysis of the Southern racial problems see MvnDA, AN AMERICAN
DILEMMA (1942).
27. One commentator points out: "Unfortunately, this does not mean that we are
now on the verge of achieving real democracy in real estate opportunities. Community
prejudice, re-enforced by voluntary adherence to written and unwritten agreements or
customs, will, perhaps, continue to make America safe for hypocrisy." Scanlan, supra
note 2, at 190. See also Note, 1 BAYLoR L. R~v. 20, 43 (1948).
28. Frank lists three other pressures which will tend to maintain residential segre-
gation: the (1) "code of ethics" of real estate dealers forbid them to sell property to a
Negro outside certain areas, (2) the inability for a Negro to obtain credit for a mortgage
even if he has a willing seller outside the marked area, and (3) if the sale is direct from
a white owner to the Negro with ready cash, community pressure against the white
seller when the proposed sale becomes known would be so great that it would probably
not be consummated. Frank, supra note 13, at 25.
29. For already attempted or established methods of maintaining residential segre-
gation see Scanlan, supra note 2, at 182; Ming, supra note 13, at 216.
